

The End of Britain?: Challenges from Devolution, European Integration, and Multiculturalism

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The aim of this paper is to examine the future of Britain and Britishness considering simultaneous challenges from immigration, devolution, and further integration into the EU. These three challenges are discussed from six different perspectives, namely Welsh and Scottish nationalism, English nationalism, Conservative and Labour's British nationalism, and that of ethnic minorities. I explore whether Britishness has been shared or denied and reinforced or weakened among these different groups. I also explore how these groups justify their position on devolution, European integration, and multiculturalism. This essay eventually focuses on New Labour's rationales to reshape Britain and reinforce Britishness in terms of a multilevel governance entity, and a combination of pride and interest.

Keywords: *Britishness, Collective Identity, Multiculturalism, Regional Nationalism, Asymmetrical Devolution, Multilevel Governance*

1. BRITISHNESS IN CONTRA FLOWS

Britain, formerly an Empire and now a European nation-state, faces simultaneous challenges from immigration, devolution, and further integration into the EU. Immigration from the New Commonwealth has caused worries about erosion of cultural homogeneity; devolution has precipitated a possible situation of the break-up of Britain; and European integration has brought conflicts between British common law tradition and European written constitutional tradition.¹

The aim of this essay is to examine the future of Britain and Britishness considering these three challenges. These challenges are discussed from six different perspectives, namely Welsh and Scottish nationalism, English nationalism, Conservative and Labour's British nationalism, and that of ethnic minorities. I explore whether Britishness has been shared or

¹ Britain has national minorities — the Welsh, the Scots, and the Irish in Northern Ireland — and ethnic minorities — Caribbean Africans and South Asians, whose origin has colored immigration from the New Commonwealth. The British Empire distinguished between the Old Commonwealth, which included Australia, New Zealand, and Canada and the New Commonwealth that consisted of South Asian and Caribbean countries. According to the 2001 national census, Britain has 4.6 million or 7.9 percent ethnic minorities (including 660,000 of mixed ethnic groups) out of a total population of about 58.8 million. The population of each nation is about 49 million in England, 5 million in Scotland, 2.9 million in Wales, and 1.7 million in Northern Ireland. National and ethnic minorities have different characteristics. National minorities typically have been incorporated into the larger state by conquest, colonization or treaty, involuntarily in many cases, and they frequently wish to maintain their status as a distinct society within the larger state. Ethnic groups, by contrast, have their source in the voluntary immigration of people from one state to another, and the individual members of ethnic groups wish to integrate into the majority society, even though they want to preserve their cultural tradition of origin (Kymlicka 1995).

denied and reinforced or weakened among these different groups. I also explore how these groups justify their position on devolution, European integration, and multiculturalism.

This essay eventually focuses on Labour's British nationalism, that is, New Labour's rationales to reshape Britain and reinforce Britishness. I analyze New Labour's project in terms of a multilevel governance entity that has a different power of self-government according to regions (Marks and Hooghe 2001). I also address a possibility of the project's success focusing on its characteristics of a normative vision and a kind of game plan as well.²

Scholars have argued about the future of Britain and Britishness. One group emphasizes the formal characteristic of Britishness, which has no substance and is seen as soon disappearing in the face of devolution and European integration (Colley 2000; Nairn 2000; Marquand 2000). In this view, when the legacy of the British Empire has been dissolved and European others have disappeared, Britain has no meaning. Britain is simply demoted to a mere administrative structure that is bloodless, historyless, and affectless (Marquand 1997; 2000).

The other perspective stresses the positive contribution of Britain to the development of democracy and expects the nation's core values to continue after adjusting themselves to various challenges (Canovan 1996; Dewar 1998; Aughey 2001). According to this view, Britain has developed a community of interest, or democratic solidarity, since 1707. Whatever the old logic to the union was, there is now a new commonality that we can call a collective identity (Canovan 1996). For example, the National Health Service, economic linkages, and national security concerns have taken their place as common interests among the four nations (Dewar 1998: 18-19).

What then is the nature of Britain and Britishness? How has it been formed and challenged in modern and contemporary history? We can trace at least three historical characteristics regardless of position. First of all, Britain was an invention historically constructed after contingency of the 1707 arrangement. It was not based on cultural and ethnic homogeneity, but based on political construction (Colley 2000).³

From the early eighteenth century, Britain has been the common name to call together nations of England, Scotland, Wales, and later Ireland. The spread of protestant belief, many wars against European others, and the pride of the British Empire had been the major impetus to promote sharing Britishness. The construction of British identity had been

² This essay is basically a narrative, not about what people actually believe, but about what popular periodicals, famous scholars, and politicians claim they believe. I analyze various discourses of politicians and scholars, which have appeared in newspapers, journals, and books. My approach to exploring political ideas can be justified on two grounds. First, a mode of existence of identity is highly derivative in the middle of public discourses. Accordingly, tracing such discourses can provide a perspective of the existing political and social identity. Second, ideas and political arguments of leading figures tend to work as an institutional structure that shape people's action and influence their perception. These two grounds are drawn from the role of idea and leadership, which is common in a new institutional approach (Hall and Taylor 1996; 1998; Hay and Wincott 1998).

³ The official name of this state, commonly called Britain, is 'The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland', which consists of four nations: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. England incorporated Wales by two Acts of Parliament in 1536 and 1543. Scotland was made part of the Kingdom by merging its parliament with English parliament in 1707. Through the Act of Union in 1800, Ireland was also made part of the Kingdom. In 1921, Ireland achieved independence and Northern Ireland remained as a part of the Kingdom.

completed in the nineteenth century and culminated in the World War I (Park 1997: 19-45). However, there has always been tension and conflicts among the four nations, especially over the dominance of England. While some of them have nicely adjusted themselves into being British, or the multiple identities of British and one's nationality of origin, others have denied to be British choosing the exclusive identity of one's original nation.

For example, according to the General Household Survey by the Office for National Statistics in 2001, which included national identity questions for the first time, 31 percent of the UK people regarded themselves exclusively as British, 15 percent regarded themselves as British and one of English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish at the same time, and 49 percent as only one of English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish. So, just 46 percent of the people, including those who have multiple identities, share a British identity. This ratio is lowered in Scotland where only 27 percent say that they are British or British and Scottish, while 80 percent say that they are Scottish. In Wales 35 percent choose British, and 62 percent Welsh. In England 48 percent choose British, and 57 percent English (The Office for National Statistics 2002). These figures illustrate that there is a salient difference in people's mind according to regions, which would be source to justify the desire of each nation for self-government away from Britain.

Second, as such, Britain was not a unitary state even though it was the result of a political compromise. With relatively low threats of invasion compared to other European countries and the strong veto powers of the Commons since the seventeenth century, the British monarchy did not develop any sort of the stable unit of a state apparatus like in France (Dyson 1980: 36-43). According to Nettl, the only common usage of the word 'state' in British history was in connection with the concept of the welfare state. But even in the economic sense of its usage, it did not replace the more deeply anchored cultural statelessness of British politics and society as a whole. The absence of autonomous areas of state activity could make for relatively rich debates with respect to self-government of the locals and the four nations as well (Nettl 1968: 583).⁴

However, the accidental aspect of Britishness was complemented by the extension of common rights of citizenship, which are based on reciprocal rights and duties, reforms without revolution, a sense of public service, and the notion of the nation as an ethical institution (Scot 1990: 193-94; Aughey 2001: 36). According to Aughey, while the identity of the four nations was mainly defined by the ethnic and cultural commonality, Britishness went with the expansion of this common citizenship. The political characteristics of Britishness provided a good environment in which people accepted multiple identities more easily. In this sense, the liberal legacy of the British Empire that fostered individual freedom, the rule of law, and tolerance of difference was the reason for being British over English, Scot, or Welsh.

Nevertheless, difference in the interest of Wales and Scotland has been widened from that of England and furthermore, that of Britain as a whole, especially with respect to the recent agenda of European integration. The nationalists in Scotland and Wales have demanded a more radical form of self-government and regarded the EU as a positive environment for their desire toward the diffusion of territorial power. By contrast, a majority of English, under the name of British, have ardently campaigned against European integration with the concern for protecting British tradition of parliamentary sovereignty. But, because of the

⁴ In this context, Nettl regarded the problem of functional equivalence in the following terms: continental Europe — state; Britain — political party; the United States — law (Nettl 1968: 577).

sheer size of England, the negative position of England under a voice of Britain has overridden the interests of Scotland and Wales. Even in the current situation as a member of the EU, Britain has always tried to limit the EU's development as an intergovernmental network, out of two competing trends in the development of the EU, that is, sovereignty-sharing supranationalism and sovereignty-preserving intergovernmentalism.

Third, Britishness is also rooted in the notion of the authority of the Crown, in which the nation was founded on the patriotic allegiance of the people to the monarch. With that allegiance, all subjects were included as members of the nation irrespective of their regional, cultural or national differences. This monarchic tradition was often mentioned as reason that Britain lacked an idea of the people that was a critical component of coherent nationalism. According to Nairn, this situation was supplemented by supposing an enemy in and outside of the nation (Nairn 1981: 294-95; 2000). Historically, that enemy was sometimes France in Colley's interpretation, and sometimes the British black minority in Nairn's view. However, Britain has now lost its one significant other as European integration has furthered. In this situation the role of ethnic minorities as the only remaining other becomes more important. The challenge of multiculturalism is, therefore, quite ambivalent in the sense that it can be mobilized to function as both threat and chance to reinforcing Britishness.

Interestingly, the meaning of devolution and European integration is quite different to national and ethnic minorities. While devolution means a realization of self-government to national minorities, for ethnic minorities it could mean being excluded from more narrowly defined ethnic categories. Ethnic minorities cannot easily become a Scot, Welsh, and English. Therefore, with the rising of regional nationalism, they would lose a haven that a multinational Britain has provided. The same would be true for the European integration case. While European integration means a possible detour toward the EU skipping the British state to national minorities, for ethnic minorities it could mean an erosion of British identity upon which they have traditionally relied.

As such, three levels of challenges have different implication for each of the six related parties. The destiny of Britain and Britishness have been complicated in this matrix of concurrent challenges from devolution, European integration, and multiculturalism. Let us now examine the changing connotation of Britain and Britishness from the viewpoint of five kinds of nationalism and of ethnic minorities.

2. WELSH CULTURAL NATIONALISM

The first real attempts at devolution, or home rule in Britain, were the Liberal leader Gladstone's Irish Bills of 1886 and 1893, which were both defeated. The third bill, introduced in 1912, became law in 1914. However, with the outbreak of war the Act was suspended and, in fact, it never came into effect (Bogdanor 1999a). The devolution agenda again returned in 1968 when the Labour government appointed a Royal Commission on the Constitution.

In 1974 the Labour government eventually succeeded in legislating for both Scotland and Wales, and referendums were held on March 1, 1979. Wales rejected devolution with the results of Yes, 20.2 percent and No, 79.8 percent, out of the 58.8 percent turnout. The Scots endorsed it with the results of Yes, 51.6 percent and No, 48.5 percent out of the 62.9 percent turnout. However, the Scots did not achieve devolution because of the number regulation which required 40 percent approval out of total entitled voters. According to that regulation,

the Yes vote was 32.85 percent of the possible electorate (Bogdanor 1999a: 190). Following the successful referendum in 1997, Scotland and Wales finally achieved devolution in 1999.

Why then did the people of Wales reject devolution in 1979? To answer this question one should mention the limit of Welsh nationalism. The main characteristics of Welsh nationalism have been culturist, a movement of language preservation and cultural defense (Nairn 1981). Interestingly, though, only 19 percent of the people in Wales now speak Welsh. This narrow base of Welsh cultural nationalism means that it lacks a persuasive idea of the people. Of course, there is no need that Welshness should entail a political sense of nationhood in every occasion. But only a 20.2 percent approval in the 1979 devolution referendum seems to confirm the weakness of this political Welshness.

Judging from the low approval rate in the 1997 referendum which recorded a 50.3 percent vote out of the 51.3 percent turnout, one can argue that a realistic view is still dominant in Wales (Aughey 2001: 116). People in Wales acknowledge the political limit of cultural Welshness and pragmatic advantage of Britishness, which is offered when they choose to stay under the umbrella of Britain. Accordingly, the choice of Welsh people in the 1997 referendum was not a Parliament with tax-varying powers, but an Assembly without a taxation right. In other words, the Government of Wales Act provides, not legislative devolution, but executive devolution, the devolution of secondary legislation and other executive powers.

In this regard, the relevant question for devolution in Wales has often been who is the 'self' in self-government. The existence of citizens who have enough solidarity to sustain a polity and their voluntary participation in public activities are the fundamental conditions to constitute an autonomous political community. Adrian Kay and others, therefore, pay attention to the role of Welsh Assembly in fostering a separate Welsh political identity to replace the existing fragile polity in terms of the normative value of autonomy (Rawlings 1998: 461-509; Kay 2003: 51-66).

In the May 1999 Welsh Assembly election, Plaid Cymru, the Welsh nationalist party, won 17 seats on 29.5 percent of the vote, which made it the second largest party next to the Labour, which won 28 seats on 36.5 percent of the vote. Out of a total of 60 seats that consisted of 40 from constituencies and 20 from party lists, the Conservative won 9 seats on 16.2 percent vote and the Liberal Democrats claimed 6 seats on 13 percent of the vote. Plaid Cymru, which has asserted full self-government, had slowly, but steadily expanded its base. It gained 7.8 percent in the 1983 general election, 7.3 percent in 1987, 8.8 percent in 1992, 9.9 percent in 1997, and 14.3 percent in 2001,

Jonathan Bradbury argues that one of the reasons for this expansion resulted from the Thatcherite program of privatization. Plaid Cymru has based its policies on socialist principles since its inception in 1925. However, the Thatcherite project shifted the focus of Welsh politics from an old socialist economy to a need for inward investment. During the New Right's privatization, the urgent task for Wales was to sell itself as an attractive nation within the EU. This process encouraged Wales to estimate devolution positively. In this sense, Thatcher would be said as the midwife of devolution (Bradbury 1998: 130-133).

Regarding the multi-level relations among Wales, Britain, and the EU, Eurig Wyn, a Member of the European Parliament of Plaid Cymru, shows well a Welsh nationalist's position. According to him, "The rights of the stateless nations of Europe — like Wales and Scotland — will be better represented in the European Union than through the British state. The regional disparity in Britain, measured through unemployment and low wages, is now

the worst in Europe, and is not being addressed properly by the British state. The European Union has a far better regional policy” (*NewsWales* 4/2/2002).

Although a majority of Welsh people acknowledge a pragmatic advantage of Britishness, Welsh nationalists deny the positive role of the British state. They want their own nationality and greater integration into the EU. Under a federal EU, they believe a safer space for their national self-government can be guaranteed.

3. SCOTTISH “PHILISTINE” NATIONALISM

Scottish nationalism differs from that of Wales in several aspects. As Tom Nairn said, if Welsh nationalism was culturist, then Scottish nationalism tended to be philistine (Nairn 1981: 197). Its characteristic was more politically oriented, though it was not necessarily politicized. The Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), which was founded in 1934 and declared its aim to create an independent state in the mainstream of Europe, was stronger in its electoral gains than the Plaid Cymru in Wales. For example, the SNP won 11.8 percent of the support in the 1983 general election, 14.0 percent in 1987, 21.5 percent in 1992, 22.1 percent in 1997, and 20.06 percent in 2001.

As evidence of a higher level of political orientation in Scottish nationalism, one can point out that Scotland had the convention to deal with devolution matters. It is very important in terms of a democratic process to collect the voluntary agreement among the people as citizens of an (would-be) autonomous polity through such a convention. The Scottish Constitutional Convention was established in March 1989, following the recommendation of *A Claim of Right for Scotland*, the report that the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly published in July 1988.

For the Labour Party, the Convention was the useful vehicle to absorb Scottish discontent with Westminster politics and to develop proposals for devolution. Tony Blair acknowledges that “the Scottish Constitutional Convention process has helped produce cross-party consensus about the case for change” (Blair 1996: 272). However, the SNP withdrew from the convention because it would not recommend independence and the Scottish Conservatives refused to join the convention because they believed that the convention already shared an independence mindset (Aughey 2001: 140).

In the 1997 referendum, the result was 74.3 percent to 25.7 percent in favor of a Scottish Parliament, and 63.5 percent to 36.0 percent in favor of tax-varying power (Bogdanor 1999a: 199). The Scottish Parliament was granted to levy taxes by varying income tax by up to three pence in the pound. Excluding five areas in which power was reserved to Westminster, such as macro-economic policy, social security, foreign affairs, defense and constitutional matters, all other matters were devolved to the Scottish Parliament. The results of the 1999 election for the Scottish Parliament were Labour 56, SNP 35, Conservative 18, Liberal Democrat 17, and three independents out of a total of 129 seats.

One of the common denominators in Scottish nationalism is said to be an anti-English sentiment. With respect to the motive of anti-English sentiment, Jack Brand argued that the enemy of Scottish nationalists was not the English people but those British institutions that could have been portrayed as part of the English establishment (Brand 1978; 1987). This argument can be explained from the SNP’s unusual stance as a nationalist party. Like the Plaid Cymru, the SNP has supported social democratic policy. For them, the libertarian approach of the New Right was regarded as the typical English way. So, in the SNP’s view,

Thatcherite revolution could mean that the English libertarian way attempted to dissolve Scottish social democratic traditions. In fact, Thatcher criticized Scottish socialist tradition and described Scotland as the only place where her libertarian revolution did not work (Thatcher 1993: 618-19). These ideological differences were behind the hostility of Scotland against England.

Scottish and Welsh nationalists believe that their national self-government can be better guaranteed in the mainstream of Europe. European integration is certainly a good environment to encourage their claim for self-government. For example, according to a January 2002 poll, Wales was the first nation to back single euro currency membership. The poll showed that 41 percent of Welsh respondents said they would vote 'Yes' to joining the Euro, 40 percent would vote 'No', 4 percent would abstain and 15 percent 'Don't Know'. When the don't knows are excluded, the majority edges to 51 to 49 percent in favor of the Euro. Polling in Scotland also showed a softening of opposition with a 5 percent gap — 37 percent 'Yes' to 42 percent 'No' (*The Guardian* 1/15/2002). Another poll in June 2004 suggested that support for the proposed EU constitutional treaty is higher in Scotland than in the rest of Britain. The 'Yes' in Scotland is 38 percent over 'No' of 35 percent. The overall British figures are 31 percent 'Yes' to 45 percent 'No' in this poll.⁵

The differences in regional approval rates, especially England's low support for joining the euro, may bring serious conflicts among the four nations if this difference remains until the referendum that is likely to be held in the near future. Timothy Garton Ash points out this problem. In Ash's view, it is Europe and federalism that could be the only way to save Britain. He argues that "British opposition to Europe is largely English opposition to Europe. Attitudes toward Europe in Scotland and Wales are much more positive. A Conservative opposition that continued on its anti-European course could end up destroying the very thing it claimed to defend: the United Kingdom (Garton 2001). This salient difference between Scottish nationalists and Conservative British nationalists in their positions toward Europe and devolution resulted in no Conservative's seat in Scotland in the 1997 general election and only one seat in the 2001 general election. Both in Scotland and Wales, the nationalist movement is getting wider support even though there are still some differences in approach between the radical group which wants immediate independence and the moderate group which insists independence without too much cost.

4. LABOUR'S BRITISH NATIONALISM AND ASYMMETRICAL DEVOLUTION

What then is the rationale of New Labour for the devolution policy? What is the position of Labour's British Nationalists on Europe? New Labour certainly wants to keep Britain. Labour politics traditionally desired Britain to be differentiated by income and class, and not by geography. In the Consensus politics era, Labour promoted national solidarity through redistributive taxation, full employment, and welfare provisions. It believed that cleavages due to income and class could be healed by these policies, thus national solidarity would be maintained.

The solidarity fostered by the welfare policies had rendered the claims of self-government unproblematic as long as there was economic growth. But, as Anthony Giddens

⁵ An NOP poll commissioned by 'Britain in Europe,' the pro-European campaign organization in the UK, in June 17, 2004. <http://www.britainineurope.org.uk>.

points out, two presuppositions for the Keynesian Consensus era, state control of national economy and state protection of the underprivileged, have faced a radical challenge with the emergence of global economic circumstance (Giddens 1994: 74). Britain cannot keep those practices of the Consensus era. Therefore, New Labour now suggests not old rhetoric of class solidarity, but social solidarity of citizenship in one nation, which is described as a multicultural, multiethnic, and multinational citizenship.

In fact, from the pragmatic viewpoint, the aim of New Labour's devolution policy is to remove the ground of Scottish and Welsh separatists, thus maintaining a unified Britain. But it also has a normative vision. According to Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, devolution makes citizens share the decision making, through which individuals recognize social obligation of citizenship for their community (Brown 2000: 21-23). Blair also emphasizes that the imperative for devolution is new common citizenship since the individual empowerment can be found in the participatory democracy that devolved institutions foster (Blair 1998: 15).

In addition, Blair argues that devolution is neither some quasi-nationalist form of government, nor a watered down form of separatism, or a form of federalism. He distinguishes New Labour's devolution policy from a possible development of the federal Britain. While one may suggest the form of a federation in which the English parliament is allowed as well as one each for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, the problem of asymmetry would not be resolved by such federation because "England has four-fifths of the population and the sense of national and regional identity and the desire for autonomy varies greatly" (Blair 1996: 270).

The Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1973 already warned of this symmetrical federalism. According to the Commission, such federation would be dominated by the overwhelming political importance and wealth of England. The English parliament would rival the United Kingdom's federal parliament. Accordingly, it would be unworkable and an unrealistic option (Bogdanor 1999b: 185-194). In this context, for New Labour, federalism may appeal to some, but it is not what New Labour proposes. New Labour's policy is asymmetrical devolution, in which Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have their own parliament, but England does not.

How then can this unfair situation to England due to the New Labour's devolution policy be fixed? What is New Labour's solution to this problem? New Labour argues that if devolution in England is to serve the same ends as devolution in Scotland and Wales, it must be devolution to the English regions, not to an English parliament. So, New Labour introduced a directly elected mayor and a regional development agency. It did have a London mayoral election in 2000; independent Ken Livingston was elected as mayor.

New Labour also published a white paper, *Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalizing English Regions* in May 2002, in which eight regional assemblies of England can eventually be established instead of regional development agency. In May 2003, the Devolution Bill for England was given final royal assent, thereby the government can call for a referendum when each region wants to have its own assembly.⁶ After all, New Labour tries to solve the complicated needs of devolution, especially that of England, through reshaping Britain as a multilevel governance entity that has different powers of self-government according to regions.

⁶ Deputy Prime Minister and the Secretary for the Transport, Local Government and Regions, 2002, *Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalizing English Regions*, London: HMSO.

What then is the relationship between Labour's devolution policy and its stance on European integration? In the 1950s, Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell opposed the European Common market because of his passionate sense of obligation to the Commonwealth. The left at the time had an instinctive dislike of what was felt to be a part of a continental cartel of capitalists. The Treaty of Rome in 1957 was argued to be incompatible with Labour's ambitions for more nationalization and planning (Mandelson and Liddle 1996: 25-6).

However, New Labour now argues that the only way that Britain can regain true sovereignty is its committed participation in the European Union. Because, for them, sovereignty means, not merely the ability of a single country to say no, but the power to maximize national strength and capacity in trade, foreign policy, and defense. Sovereignty also means the political ability to tackle problems in the public interests, which have slipped beyond the nation state, such as global warming, international economic cooperation, and the prevention of future wars in Europe (Mandelson and Liddle 1996: 27).

Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary from 1997 to 2001, argues that Britishness is being strengthened by devolution and membership in the EU.⁷ Blair also assessed in his 2001 speech that the history of Britain's engagement with Europe is one of the opportunities missed in the name of illusions and Britain is suffering as a result.⁸ Accordingly, in Blair's view, the greatest disservice any British leader could do to the British people today is to seek to perpetuate those illusions.

In this context, Blair argues that joining the EU does not bring the loss of British national sovereignty. He says, "When Britain isolated itself in the past, we squandered our sovereignty — leaving us sole masters of a shrinking sphere of influence." Therefore, "it is time for us to adjust to the fact (Blair 2001)." More importantly, Europe is in Britain's economic interest. Nearly 60 per cent of British trade is with the rest of Europe. Accordingly, Blair concludes "Britain has no economic future outside Europe (Blair 2001)."

New Labour has re-evaluated Britain's old policy on European integration and argued for the need of new approach. Labour's British nationalism has always remained faithful to Britain. But, with a shift of power from the Old Left to New Labour, its strategy has also changed from old rhetoric of class solidarity to social solidarity of common citizenship, from the intentional ignorance of geography to asymmetrical devolution, and from a dislike of continental capitalist cartels to active participation in European integration.

As a result, New Labour's efforts have provided a new environment for both ethnic and national minorities. Its asymmetrical devolution removed the ground of extreme separatists without the break-up of Britain and gave a different level of self-government to national minorities. The possible disadvantageous situation for ethnic minorities due to devolution has been countered by locating Britain as a center of multi-level governance and reinforcing Britishness as a central value of that entity. In principle, ethnic minorities can choose to be British in various ways such as Indian British or Caribbean British in this devolved Britain.

⁷ Cook emphasized that "Britain is a European country in its geography and history. All Britain has to lose is the timidity which prevents Britain from embracing our European destiny and from recognizing that it is a source of confidence in our nation's future." (Cook 2001)

⁸ Blair (2001) argued "We said that it wouldn't happen. Then we said it wouldn't work. Then we said we did not need it. But it did happen. And Britain was left behind."

5. CONSERVATIVE BRITISH NATIONALISM AND PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY

What then is the position of Conservative British nationalists on devolution, European integration, and multiculturalism? When one refers to the Conservative 'one nation', it has two dimensions. One is to sustain class harmony uniting the rich and the poor, the other is to maintain the territorial union of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In all fairness, one nation, since the nineteenth century Conservative Prime Minister Disraeli's usage, was at the core of Conservative thinking; unifying the two dimensions was the ultimate identity that Conservative British nationalists pursued.

A Conservative Britain is also defined by the four core values: parliamentary sovereignty, individualist society, homogeneous culture, and an independent island without commitment toward Europe (Parekh 2000a: 9-12). Accordingly, Conservative British nationalists reject both devolution and EU integration. For them, devolution of power to Scotland and Wales means to give power to anti-parliamentary groups, which could eventually destroy the unity and identity of Britain. A further integration into the EU is also evaluated as giving up the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.

Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament has the unlimited legislative authority, thus no person, even the courts, has a right to override the decision of Parliament (Goldsworthy 1999: 9-21). To illustrate, Parliament was the highest court in the land and the authority of last resort from which no appeal was possible. All subjects were represented in Parliament and its decision reflected the collective wisdom of the entire community, which was superior to that of any other agency in the state. People were, therefore, deemed to consent to Parliament's acts and to be forbidden from disputing them (Goldsworthy 1999: 234).

In Conservative traditions, as Thatcher vigorously campaigned, sovereign individuals under sovereign parliament were ideal. There would be no exceptions, only equality of citizenship and freedom of opportunity throughout the whole of the United Kingdom. Therefore, if one tries to define British citizens as members of minority groups, for Conservatives, this would mean to deny their truth as sovereign individuals.

There is a real temptation for the Conservative Party to exploit the grievance of England by playing the English card since New Labour's devolution policy has been unfair to England. However, the Conservative Party has not yet fully succumbed to that temptation despite its main electoral base being in England. A majority of Conservative MPs, including its leaders Thatcher and Hague, have never supported English nationalism in their public appearances. They always talk about keeping Britain and Britishness. This stance reflects their dilemma in which they should appeal to England without alienating Scotland and Wales.

For example, on Scotland's hostility against England, Thatcher asserted that the Tory party was not an English party, but a Unionist one. If it sometimes seemed English to some Scots, said Thatcher, that was because the Union was inevitably dominated by England by reason of its greater population. Thatcher conceded that, as nations, Scotland and Wales have an undoubted right to national self-determination. But, it only had to be exercised by joining and remaining in the Union. For Thatcher, to demand devolution as a right of nationhood inside the Union was absurd (Thatcher 1993: 624).

William Hague, a Conservative Leader from 1997 to 2001, also lines up with this kind of Conservative tradition. Hague argues that the identity of Britain is to be found in institutions

rather than in ethnicity.⁹ In the 2001 general election, he called on Eurosceptics outside of the Tory party to back the Conservatives at the election so that they could preserve an independent Britain and allow British people to remain sovereign in their own country. Hague also placed asylum and Europe at the heart of a campaign by evoking fears that four more years of Labour government would turn Britain into a foreign land. If so, Hague argues, British people feel like strangers in their own country, where control of the economy was given away to Brussels.¹⁰

Hague's arguments are basically a pledge to preserve Britain and Britishness. But, how do all these words resonate to the Scots and Welsh people? It is probably not easy for them to distinguish the voice of British nationalists from that of English nationalists.

Kenneth Clark, former Conservative Chancellor under Major, pointed out that the Conservative Party would never form a truly national government unless it abandoned its English nationalism. "We did behave as an English party at the 2001 election, thus failed to win any seats in Wales and just one seat in Scotland" (*The Guardian* 7/4/2001) In fact, here is the Conservative's dilemma. It cannot ignore its main electoral gains from England as well as its commitment toward Britain. But, as far as it seems to favor England, it would face hostility from Scotland and Wales.

6. ENGLISH NATIONALISM AND A QUESTION OF SYMMETRY

The position of English nationalists is different from that of the Conservative majority and its leaders who want to cherish Britishness. It shows a more extreme view. With the rise of Scottish and Welsh nationalism, New Labour's devolution policy has also offered a better climate for English nationalists in which they can publicly argue for the break-up of Britain in support of their own English parliament. The reason for supporting devolution for English nationalists is quite different from that of Scottish and Welsh nationalists. They regard Scotland and Wales as mere sources of trouble and subsidy-draining peripheries (Gamble 2000: 2). So, they want to break up Britain without any further commitment to Scotland and Wales and to have their own parliament.

In January 1998, the Eurosceptic Conservative backbencher Teresa Gorman moved a private member's bill calling for a referendum on an English parliament. But this position has been unacceptable for the Conservative leaders as well as for New Labour's plan of keeping Britain.

English nationalists also show an anti-multicultural stance. They are worried about increasing number of ethnic minorities who are assumed to undermine a homogeneous Anglo-Saxon society. In the 2001 general election, the three Tory MPs, James Cran, Eric

⁹ Hague said "Britishness must be patriotism without bigotry. Parliamentary sovereignty is to stay at the core value of British identity. Individualism remained one of them, but so too was loyalty to the institutions of civil society." (Hague 1999).

¹⁰ The Guardian, March 6, 2001. Hague declared, "It is time to bring it back, it is time to bring Britain home. Above all, the people of Britain believe in their country. They are not narrow nationalists. They are not xenophobes. But they take pride in what our country has achieved." In Hague's view, New Labour rather derided Britishness. "Talk about Europe and they call you extreme. Talk about asylum and they call you racist. Talk about your nation and they call you little Englanders." (*The Times*, March 5, 2001).

Forth, and John Townsend, refused to sign a cross-party pledge to not stir up racial hatred in the election campaign, which was initiated by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). Among them, Eric Forth refused to sign the pledge on libertarian grounds, making it clear that he will not allow his freedom of speech to be impaired by any organization.

But, John Townsend, MP for East Yorkshire, told the CRE chairman Garbux Singh that he would not sign the compact because it would be hypocritical to be associated with an organization he wanted to abolish. He wrote, "I believe that as a result of some of your activities some people are more equal than others" (*The Scotsman* 4/27/2001).

Townsend also accused Tony Blair of pandering to Celtic nationalism and being prepared to abandon English history by taking Britain into a federal Europe. "The English feel their interests are ignored by a government dominated by Scots. I think Mr. Blair has no love for or belief in the English nation or its history. He accepts Celtic nationalism but he sees English patriotism as a threat to his dream of a United States of Europe" (*The Scotsman* 4/27/2001).

Later, Christopher Gill, a Conservative MP for Ludlow backed Townsend's remark, comparing asylum seekers to 'rats in a bucket'. Sir Richard Body, the Conservative MP for Boston and Skegness, fuelled the controversy over this turbulence with the launch of his book, *England for the English*, in which he argued that ethnic minorities would never feel committed to this country until they were taught about England's history and core values (*The Times* 4/20/2001).

In many cases, however, those who respected English traditions remained loyal to Britain. For example, although Enoch Powell, as a precursor of the New Right, espoused authentic and rooted Englishness in his ardent campaign of anti-immigration in the 1960s, he remained a committed British unionist. But, extreme English nationalists claim that England does not need to sacrifice its identity continuously for the sake of Britain. They argue that England must return home from Britishness to find a nation (Heffer 1999).

The finest view of English nationalist would be that of Roger Scruton. In his book, *England: an Elegy*, Scruton (2000) says, at a time when Scottish, Welsh, and Irish nationalism are flourishing and English nationalism disapproved, when the customs and the institutions of the English are being dismantled either from outside by the EU or from inside by the political elite, it is time to ask what England should do.

In Scruton's view, the dominant social mood now says that, if one wants to mourn the death of English tradition, one may mourn, but privately. English stoicism, decorum, honesty, gentleness, and its sexual puritanism are disappearing. For Scruton (2000: 243), this is operated by "anonymous bureaucrats who are not us, but them."

Scruton also criticizes New Labour's European policy as the transfer of sovereignty to the EU. With this extraordinary movement, not only has endless legislation effectively marginalized the common law tradition, but also English courts are required to apply European directives. Scruton deplores that the English are now ruled not by judgments but by decrees. Their law is no longer their own, thus they are no longer a sovereign people (Scruton 2000: 247-52).

As such, English nationalists prefer neither a multinational tradition of Britain nor a multiethnic legacy of the British Empire. They also object to any positive stance toward European integration. Instead, they want to preserve the Englishness of the white majority in a relatively isolated form.

7. ETHNIC MINORITIES AND MULTICULTURALISM

How then can devolution and European integration be defined from the viewpoint of ethnic minorities? Judging from the state of distribution of ethnic minorities, one might say that there is no direct relationship between devolution and ethnic minority. According to the 2001 census, of the 4.6 million ethnic minorities in Britain, 96 percent (4.4 million) live in England, only 2.1 percent (96,000) reside in Scotland, and 1.2 percent (55,000) in Wales. However, if one focuses on the level of national identity that ethnic minorities would choose to join, the future development of devolution and the discourses surrounding it certainly bring an important implication for the cultural survival of ethnic minorities.

We can examine the differences between multiculturalists and British nationalists in interpreting Britishness from the controversy surrounding the Parekh Report, *The Future of Multiethnic Britain*. The Commission on the Future of Multiethnic Britain, chaired by Lord Bhikhu Parekh, was established by the Runnymede Trust, a famous race relations think-tank in the UK. It began the project in January 1998 after being launched by Jack Straw, the then Home Secretary, and published its final report in October 2000.

The Report argues for the urgent need of re-imagining Britain as a multicultural nation, and suggests several policy recommendations, such as the abolition of asylum vouchers, full appeal rights against deportation, an establishment of a human rights commission, and government's official declaration of Britain as a multicultural society (Parekh 2000b: 56).

Immediate and severe controversy came from two chapters of the report; chapter 2, 'Rethinking the National Story' and chapter 3, 'Identities in Transition.' In those chapters the Report asserts that, for ethnic minorities, Britishness is a reminder of colonization and has systematic, largely unspoken, racial connotations. "Whiteness is nowhere featured as an explicit condition of being British, but it is widely understood that Britishness is racially coded. Race is deeply entwined with political culture and with the idea of nation, and underpinned by a distinctively British kind of reticence" (Parekh 2000b: 38-9). Therefore, the Report claims that, unless the deep rooted antagonism to racial and cultural difference can be defeated in practice, the idea of a multicultural post-nation remains an empty promise.

A surprising blow to British nationalists in this Report was that it uses the term 'a community of communities' as a possible way of describing Britain as a whole. After *The Daily Telegraph*, a conservative newspaper, reported that the commission seems to peddle the anti-British agenda, the Committee was inundated by abusive and racist messages (*The Times* 10/17/2000). People assumed that the report had labeled the word Britishness as being racist. Many media also reported that the document suggested that the term British had racial connotations and was no longer appropriate in a multicultural society.

Jack Straw, Labour Home Secretary, withdrew his welcome of the Report and declared "unlike the Runnymede Trust, I firmly believe that there is a future for Britain and a future for Britishness. I am proud to be British and of what I believe to be the best of British values." He accused the Commission of ignoring what Britain had achieved in race relations, claiming "Indeed, last year I spoke publicly about how the concept of Britishness has become an inclusive plural one with people happily defining themselves as black British, or Chinese British" (*The Times* 10/12/2002; *The Daily Telegraph* 10/12/2002).

Anatole Kaletsky, a columnist of *The Times*, attacked that the Commission was so self-indulgent and insensitive as to compose the ludicrous passage on the systematic racial connotations of the word Britishness. He says, "They have forgotten Britain's remarkable

records of openness in absorbing minorities” (Kaletsky 2000). Gautam Sen, in a letter to editor of *The Times*, criticized the Commission’s desire for Stalinist-style social engineering to correct every historical text that contains earlier prejudices as absurd (*The Times* 10/12/2000). George Stern, also in a letter to editor of *The Times*, asked “How can you be patriotic about a country with no name?” (*The Times* 10/20/2000). Boris Johnson, editor of *The Spectator*, asserted that “They want to fragment and balkanize our country, to produce segregated minorities whom they can represent at the taxpayers’ expense” (Johnson 2000). In an article on the same day, *The Daily Telegraph* insisted that Conservatives should expose the Government’s collusion in this attempt to destroy a thousand years of British history.

Amid heavy attacks from the media, Parekh was forced to the defensive. He explained that the report was not an attack on Britain or British history. “We do not denigrate British history and ask instead for a just and balanced view. Too many members of the ethnic minority community were seen at best as welcome tenants in the UK rather than common owners of the country” (*The Times* 10/12/2000). Several days later, Parekh mentioned again an official opinion of the Commission in his letter to editor of *The Times*.¹¹ Although Parekh regretted that the section was not made more explicit about what they were and were not saying, he believed “two and a half pages out of 416 have been latched onto and used to preempt debate and close minds” (Jaggi 2000).

The most favorable opinion in the letters to *The Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Daily Telegraph* during the controversial two weeks, was at most David Coleman’s. He denies most of fundamental beliefs of the Commission to say one positive thing. “Despite the Runnymede Trust report’s many ill-advised proposals and the misguided assumptions, its recommendation that Britain should be declared officially multicultural may be helpful” (*The Times* 10/20/2000).

This controversy shows that Britain and Britishness can still mobilize people’s powerful emotive supports, thus seems not easily to disappear in the near future, especially when it faces some otherness like immigrants and ethnic minorities. In fact, Britain and Britishness among five kinds of regional nationalism can be assessed more positively from the viewpoint of ethnic minorities. Compared to a republican connotation of the term ‘Britain’ in the 1940s, in which ethnic minorities could be British subjects regardless of color and race, Scottish and Welsh separatists and English nationalists seek more exclusive identity based on narrowly defined cultural and ethnic origin.

Therefore, one can say that devolution and the break-up of Britain could bring a disadvantageous situation for ethnic minorities because they hardly become ethnically defined English, Scottish, or Welsh. They are more comfortable saying, “I am British.” For example, a General Household Survey in 2001 showed that 57 percent of ethnic minorities chose their identity as British, while only 11 percent chose their identity as one of English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish. This rate suggests significant difference from those of white British, in which only 44 percent chose their identity as British, while 54 percent chose their

¹¹ Parekh wrote “All we suggest is that, given the devolution of power to Scotland and Wales and eventually to English regions, Britain’s nationhood is best secured by seeing itself as a community of communities. We say racial not racist. For centuries the British population was overwhelmingly white, and hence it is perfectly natural that Britishness connotes whiteness. Things are now changing. We warmly welcome the increasing deracialization of the new Britishness which allows blacks, Asians, and others to accept it with enthusiasm.” *The Times*, October 17, 2000.

identity as one of English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish (The Office for National Statistics 2002).

From the viewpoint of negative effects of ethnic nationalism, Harry Goulbourne appraises that Britain developed a civic culture that respects individual freedom, the rule of law, and tolerance of difference. But Scottish and Welsh separatism and English nationalism are inclined to deny this tradition. So, Goulbourne worries about the rise of ethno-cultural paradigm that vacates common civic space of Britishness and retreat into exclusivity of ethnic nation (Goulbourne 1991).

Yasmin Alibhai-Brown is also surprised with cultural arrogance of Scottish Nationalist Party, which argues assimilation into superior culture rather than equality and diversity among different cultures. According to Alibhai-Brown, many black and Asian Britons in Scotland and Wales feel excluded by the new political elite who have championed ethnic oriented nationalism. They fear that the more capacious British identity that once embraced them will be discarded, leaving them as outsiders in their own land. Therefore, she supports Britishness as a civic device to bind people together without recourse to ethnicity (Alibhai-Brown 2000a; 2000b: 26-7).

If one follows these positions, Britain and Britishness can be said to have wider space to accommodate various identities of ethnic minorities than other positions. New Labour's devolved Britain would have enough capacity to adjust its practice to idealized visions of multicultural needs. In the sense that Conservative British nationalists pursue sovereign individual under the civic Britishness, they also deserve more positive evaluation in protecting the rights of ethnic minorities than other kinds of regional nationalism.

8. BRINGING BRITISHNESS BACK IN

Between two competing views on the destiny of Britishness, New Labour as the ruling party since 1997 positively assesses the core values of Britishness and their contribution to the development of democracy. They think that Britishness has enough room that can be shared among national and ethnic minorities. Therefore, they try to deal with the challenges of devolution, European integration, and multiculturalism through reshaping Britain as a multilevel governance entity. As the institutional arrangements necessary to hold together four sub-nations, New Labour has established the quasi-federal or asymmetrical devolution. The main characteristics of New Labour's policy to maintain a tolerant one nation with an intergovernmental network of Europe can be summarized as follows.

First, New Labour wants to build up one Britain based on the positive recognition of each sub-nation — England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. This position differs from English nationalists who support a symmetrical devolution. English nationalists argue no more Britain, considering Scotland and Wales as a subsidy-draining periphery. New Labour's position also differs from the view of Conservative British nationalists who do not support devolution. Conservative British nationalists argue that devolution means to deny parliamentary sovereignty as a core value of Britishness. They also insist that devolution gives power to anti-parliament group, which brings the destruction of unity and identity of Britain.

Second, New Labour gives political consideration to the legacy of the British Empire and Commonwealth, and recognizes the role of the EU as an inter-governmental network, if not a federal super-government. In contrast, arguing for British exceptionalism and favoring

isolation, Conservative British nationalists no longer accept strong commitment to the British Empire. They also oppose the trend of integration with the EU. On the other hand, Scottish and Welsh nationalists see the downfall of Britain as desirable to get their full self-government in the mainstream of Europe.

Third, New Labour acknowledges the constitutive character of national identity. It thus believes that social cohesion cannot be guaranteed by the top-down action of the state or by appeal to a traditional authority structure. It rejects conservative nationalism which holds that the unitary nation must reign supreme and that one nation inherited from the past must be protected from cultural contamination. At the same time, it also rejects the radical multiculturalism of the libertarians who want to embrace cultural pluralism at whatever cost, seeing national identity as artificially structured or as serving the interest of the ruling groups (Giddens 1998: 132). Emphasizing solidarity in one-nation, New Labour argues that a traditional British national identity can be compatible with ethnic and cultural pluralism (Blair 1996: 296; Giddens 1998: 37).

However, identity is not about pride alone, it is also about interest (Aughey 2001: 54). Pragmatically, devolution for New Labour means to remove a possible ground of extreme separatists to avoid a situation of the break-up of Britain. Britain still has attraction to four sub-nations, especially to England, in claiming their shares in the world order. For example, an independent state of England would not retain the seat as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, which the United Kingdom currently possesses. Moreover, considering violent protests of minority nationalities within multinational states, asymmetrical devolution is a small price to pay for avoiding such conflicts (Brown 1998: 215-23).

New Labour's relatively active participation in European integration process is also an inevitable choice so as not to lose its interest and voice over economic relationship with Europe, which occupies over 60 percent of the national trade. New Labour, therefore, redefines sovereignty, not merely as the ability of a single country to say no, but as the power to maximize national capacity in trade, foreign policy, and defense. It argues that sovereignty has to be deployed for national advantage, not through isolation from, but through participation in Europe.

A successful inclusion of ethnic minorities is related to peace for Britain. As was seen in the 2001 race riots that swept northern England cities such as Oldham, Burnley, Bradford, and Leeds, it has been an urgent task for New Labour to deal with minorities' desire for cultural survival as well as agony of economic deprivation. In efforts for the inclusion of ethnic minorities into a political community, Britain and Britishness becomes a good house to accommodate various identities of minorities as well as majorities. In this sense, New Labour argues the constitutive character of national identity that is compatible with ethnic and cultural pluralism.

As far as this combination of pride and interest of the related parties goes together, Britain and Britishness will not easily disappear in the near future. However, there would be some difficulties in each area of challenges. For example, while devolution certainly decentralized the power of Westminster, it also made other new centers. The Scottish parliament and Welsh assembly as emerging centers have brought erosion of autonomy that local councils previously enjoyed (Bonney 2002: 135-43). Around three-quarters of English councils believe that their powers will be stripped away to eight regional assemblies that New Labour promises to create through a referendum, likely before 2007 (*The Guardian* 5/29/2003). This phenomenon indicates that multi-level governance does not guarantee

sharing equal power according to the levels. In democratic case for devolution, local councils seem to be skeptical about the idea that devolution brings government closer to the people.

Each region as an autonomous polity also needs to have a collective identity or a high degree of trust among citizens, which is enough to accept sacrifice imposed in the name of majority, since the self-governing parliament ruling assumes such duty of all citizens (Weiler 1999; Kay 2003). If there is no collective identity or underlying belief in their essential sameness, it causes the concern for a democratic deficit. In this case, devolution as a way of maintaining Britain has no substantive meaning. It is just devolution for the sake of devolution, which lacks the voluntary agreement among people as citizens of an autonomous polity. Especially in Wales, an elected Assembly came first and it has then aimed to foster a collective identity of the Welsh people. This is typically a reversed process following the convenient statist short-cut. From the viewpoint of democratic consensus formation, a collective identity of citizens is supposed to come first and then a parliament should be assembled based on such will and trust of citizens.

Multicultural policy would also cause a problem when it aims exclusively for assimilation of minorities. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, David Blunkett, Home Secretary, declared a new framework for keeping British core values, which would set limits to the cultural pluralism of the past. He announced the introduction of an oath of allegiance for immigrants, an English language test, and tougher border control. He even denounced an arranged marriage style in South Asian communities (*The Daily Telegraph* 12/12/2001). New Labour's recent turn was criticized as the return of assimilation policy of the 1960s (Back *et al.* 2002). Accordingly, for ethnic minorities, the racial connotation of Britishness seems to be more emphasized and the idea of a multicultural post-nation seems to remain an empty promise. In this development, 'a community of communities' would gain support among minorities as a possible way of describing Britain as a whole.

In the policies regarding Europe, there will be referendums for a single currency membership and the proposed EU constitution, which are likely to be held in the near future. It could bring critical conflicts within England, and among the four nations as well, according to the differences in the approval rates. If a referendum favors opting out of the euro membership due to the low approval rate in England, despite the high approval rate in Scotland and Wales, the future of devolution can be a way to the break-up of Britain. To secure enough time to obtain a wider consensus on this agenda, Gordon Brown, Labour Chancellor, has suggested five tests by which Britain can evaluate the gains and the losses of euro membership (*The Guardian* 9/29/2000).¹²

However, despite these five test questions, the problem is that no one can agree on how to measure better conditions or positive effects. As Gus O'Donnell, director of the Treasury team, said, "economics can never be clear and unambiguous" (*The Times* 1/10/2002). Therefore, to handle further integration into the EU, and to manage its related influence on devolution and multicultural matters, ultimately will be a political decision. This means that New Labour's desire to maintain Britain as a form of the multilevel governance will face

¹² Here are the five tests. One, would joining the economic and monetary union (EMU) create better conditions for firms making long-term decisions to invest in the United Kingdom? Two, how would adopting the single currency affect our financial services? Three, are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others in Europe could live comfortably with euro interest rates on a permanent basis? Four, if problems emerge, is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them? Five, will joining EMU help to promote higher growth, stability and a lasting increase in jobs?

another phase of challenges. It should find the way to mitigate the regional difference of people's anti-Europe sentiment and its interest in maintaining influence on the future of European development.

If New Labour succeeds in overcoming these difficulties in each area of challenges, thus properly concerts to bring each group's pride as well as their interests together, the future of Britain will be close to an ethical institution that has a collective identity based on common citizenship rather than a mere administrative structure that is bloodless and affectless. People will then realize that all those turbulences were not the end of story, but just another chapter in history.

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